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ABSTRACT 
While most gender studies on microfinance have concentrated on possible women empowerment, few have asked 
why some microfinance institutions (MFIs) target women while others do not. This paper provides empirical 
evidence on the existence and consequences for an MFI of having a conscious gender bias towards women in 
microfinance. Specifically, using a global dataset of 379 MFIs in seventy-three countries, we investigate what 
characterizes MFIs that have a gender bias and how this bias affects various aspects of financial performance. The 
results indicate that a conscious gender bias is associated with group lending methodologies, international 
orientation, female leadership, smaller loans, and a noncommercial legal status. With respect to performance we find 
that having a conscious gender bias significantly improves repayment but does not enhance overall profitability. We 
find that the positive repayment effect associated with a focus on women is offset by higher costs related to smaller 
loans, leading to similar overall profitability measures. 
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GENDER BIAS IN MICROFINANCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
While the microfinance literature is rich on studies focusing on possible effects for female 
microfinance customers little knowledge exists on whether it is good business for microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) to focus on women. The main empirical questions that will be answered in 
this paper are what characterizes the MFIs that have a specific focus on women, and how does 
this gender bias influence their overall profitability. 
Microfinance and women have always been intrinsically linked. From the starting point of 
experimental schemes in Asia and Latin America in the 1970s, microfinance has been above all a 
matter of women. Many initiatives have been celebrated for their ability to reach out to women 
and enhance their welfare. Even today, the gender argument continues to be at the forefront. The 
objective of the Microcredit Summit Campaign, which plays a central role in the promotion of 
microfinance, is ‘to ensure that 175 million of the world’s poorest families, especially women, 
receive credit for self-employment and other financial and business services’ [our emphasis]1. 
When the Nobel Prize was awarded to Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank, the Nobel 
Committee highlighted the role of microcredit in women liberation (Norwegian Nobel 
Committee, 2006). Among many, Morduch (1999) argues that one of the main reasons for the 
success of microfinance in the public eye is the targeting of women. The focus on women within 
microfinance has been widely documented in the literature (Mody, 2000; Yunus, 2002). In this 
study’s dataset covering 379 MFIs from seventy-three countries, women represent 73 per cent of 
microfinance customers on average
2
 and 42 per cent of MFIs declare a conscious gender bias 
towards women. 
With the growing commercialization of microfinance, however, it remains to be seen whether 
women will continue to be the main focus of microfinance in the future. A growing number of 
socially oriented nonprofit microfinance organizations have shifted towards for-profit objectives. 
The paradigm of ‘financial sustainability’ (Zeller and Meyer, 2002) is nowadays recognized as a 
necessary pre-condition for the development and survival of modern microfinance initiatives. 
                                                          
1
 See http://www.microcreditsummit.org. 
2
 This figure is close to that in earlier literature (see, e.g., Cull et al. 2007; Daley-Harris, 2007). 
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However, this evolution towards commercially oriented and self-sustainable institutions has 
triggered serious debate within the field. 
As many authors argue, commercialization might lead to a ‘mission drift’, where MFIs turn to 
more profitable customers, that is. mainly urban, upper poor, and male (Christen, 2001; 
Copestake, 2007; Cull et al., 2008; Dichter and Harper, 2007). Others argue that female targeting 
and financial sustainability are perfectly compatible, since female targeting within microfinance 
has often been attributed to increased efficiency through high female repayment rates 
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; Mayoux, 1999). Although the win-win principle, that is, 
microfinance being profitable while still targeting the poor, is often heard in this respect, it 
remains highly contested (Balkenhol, 2007; Morduch, 1999). 
In sum, the link between female targeting and microfinance performance is highly controversial. 
Some fear that female targeting might not be profitable enough and might lead to female 
exclusion. Others argue that microfinance would instrumentalize women by using their discipline 
and docility to ensure good repayment rates and therefore increased profitability (Fernando, 
2006; Molyneux, 2002; Rankin, 2002). These two counterarguments might not even be 
contradictory: they simply reflect the fact that profitability is both a matter of repayment and 
costs and it is likely that female targeting has contrasting effects on each aspect. 
From an empirical perspective, the link between female targeting and microfinance performance 
has been poorly explored. This paper wants to eludicate this issue by means of a global empirical 
investigation of the consequences of having a deliberate focus on women. The main purpose of 
the paper is to understand how a gender bias towards women affects MFI design and MFI 
performance. To do so, we make use of a global dataset spanning 379 MFIs in seventy-three 
countries over ten years. We investigate which MFI-characteristics are associated with a 
conscious gender bias towards women and how this bias affects different aspects of the MFI’s 
financial performance. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, gender bias is associated with collective 
methods, international orientation, smaller loans, female leadership, and a noncommercial legal 
status. Second, a conscious gender bias is significantly associated with lower portfolio-at-risk 
and smaller loans. Finally, there is no significant effect of conscious gender bias on overall 
profitability measures such as operational self-sufficiency (OSS), financial self-sufficiency 
(FSS), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE). 
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These findings suggest that, from a financial perspective, there are both positive and negative 
aspects to focusing on women. On the one hand, women do repay better, which lowers risk and 
increases profitability. On the other hand, MFIs that focus on women usually make use of 
smaller loans, which increases their operational costs. The net result is that MFIs with a female 
focus have, on average, similar overall profitability measures. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and derives 
the main hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 explains the dataset and the statistical methodologies 
employed, while Section 4 reports the main empirical findings. Section 5 presents conclusions 
and this study’s main implications. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Women and Microfinance 
Throughout the old history of microfinance, women have not always been the centre of attention.  
In Europe and North America, the first initiatives of the cooperative and mutualist movement 
showed little interest for women. Lemire (2001) finds that the proportion of women in the 
cooperative movement hardly reached 10 per cent. With a quarter of female clients, mostly 
widows and unmarried, the 18
th
 century Irish funds were an exception, possibly because of their 
very small loan amounts (Hollis, 2001). 
Similarly, the first attempts to provide credit in developing countries through development banks 
and cooperative movements also showed little interest for women (Fournier and Ouédraogo, 
1996). However, this rapidly changed with the development of modern MFIs and these quickly 
gained interest in women. For instance, the proportion of female clients of the Grameen Bank 
steadily increased from 44 per cent in October 1983 to 95 per cent in 2001 (Armendariz and 
Morduch, 2005). How can we explain this sudden enthusiasm for female targeting and why do 
many microfinance organizations today still choose to focus on women? Three main arguments 
are usually put forward by donors or practitioners in favour of targeting women: (1) gender 
equality, (2) poverty reduction, and (3) MFI efficiency (Mayoux, 2001). 
With respect to gender equality, microfinance is considered an effective means of promoting 
women’s empowerment. Drawing on the findings of household economics developed over the 
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last three decades
3
, it is suggested that gender inequalities result in great part from inequalities in 
bargaining power in the context of decision making within the household. It is also suggested 
that women’s weaker bargaining power results from their smaller contribution to household cash 
flows and market-based income-generating activities. By enabling women to develop or 
strengthen income-generating activities, microfinance is likely to increase their monetary 
income, their control over their income, and their bargaining power within the household. These 
effects are expected to lead to various mutually reinforcing social, psychological, and even 
political effects: better self-esteem and self-confidence, an improvement in status within the 
family and the community, better spatial mobility, and greater visibility of women in public 
spaces, and so forth. 
As far as poverty reduction is concerned, it is argued that women invest their income to nurture 
the well-being of their families, whereas this is not always the case for men. For instance, 
Khandker (2003) finds that a 100 per cent increase in the volume of borrowing to a woman leads 
to a 5 per cent increase in the per capita household non-food expenditure and a 1 per cent 
increase in the per capita household food expenditure, whereas for men such an increase results 
in only a 2 per cent increase in non-food expenditures and a negligible change in food 
expenditures. This finding is echoed in various empirical studies conducted all over the world
4
: a 
dollar loaned to a woman seems to have a greater development impact than a dollar loaned to a 
man (World Bank 2007, p. 165). 
As far as MFI efficiency is concerned, a high female repayment rate is often the main argument. 
As described by Armendariz and Morduch (2005), the Grameen Bank originally had a majority 
of male clients but quickly decided to concentrate almost entirely on women due to repayment 
problems related to male customers. Also, far beyond the Grameen Bank’s example, it seems 
that the increasing emphasis on women in microfinance programs since the 1990s has been 
inspired by the evidence of high female repayment rates combined with the rising influence of 
gender lobbies within donor agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (Fernando, 
2006; Mayoux, 1999; Weber, 2006). According to Mayoux (2001), if gender lobbies have been 
                                                          
3
 See, for instance,Sen (1990).  
4
 See, for instance, Chant (1985), Haddad and Hoddinod (1995), Kabeer (1997), Senauer (1990), and Thomas 
(1990). 
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able to argue for targeting women, it is mainly on the grounds of high female repayment rates 
and the contribution of women's economic activity to economic growth. 
The previous discussion shows that many studies have advanced theoretical arguments 
concerning female targeting as well as its consequences. However, as has been noted by 
Armendariz and Morduch (2005), most of them are not backed by any empirical evidence. It is in 
light of these voids in the empirical research that our efforts must be seen. First, although many 
studies document the magnitude of female focus (Mody, 2000; Yunus, 2002; among others), no 
study of which we know has attempted to identify in detail the characteristics of those MFIs that 
focus on women.  
Second, empirical evidence usually confirms that women do indeed repay better than men 
(D’Espallier et al., 2009; Kevane and Wydick, 2001; Khandker et al., 1995; Sharma and Zeller, 
1997). However, MFI financial performance is more than just repayment. The financial 
efficiency of female targeting is far from obvious. It can also be argued that targeting women is 
more costly for various reasons: They borrow smaller amounts, they are less mobile and less 
educated, and they need additional services (health, education, literacy, child care, etc.) and 
maybe additional monitoring. Therefore, a focus on women and overall MFI financial 
performance goes beyond repayment rates and deserves further attention.  
 
Gender Bias and MFI Characteristics 
This sub-section discusses the hypotheses that will be tested with respects to the MFI 
characteristics that underlie a conscious gender bias towards women. Specifically, we derive 
hypotheses with respect to international orientation, lending methodology, average loan size, 
female leadership, legal status, and regulation. 
 
a. International Orientation 
The idea that microfinance should target women has largely been driven by international 
organizations such as Women's World Banking (WWB), Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP), USAID and the World Bank (Fernando, 2006; Mayoux, 2001). These networks and aid 
organizations constitute an important part of the international community’s development policy 
and therefore value the poverty reduction effect attached to focusing on women. In line with this, 
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we expect that MFIs that are internationally initiated and more internationally oriented would 
focus more on women. This line of reasoning can be described by following hypotheses: 
 
H1a. Having an international initiator is positively related with focus on women 
H1b. Membership in an international network is positively related with focus on women 
 
b. Lending Methodology 
Within microfinance a broad scale of different lending methodologies exist, such as village 
banking, solidarity groups, and individual-based lending (Kevane and Wydick, 2001; Sharma 
and Zeller, 1997). Group methodologies are usually considered ‘female’ methods: Women 
accept joining groups and spending time in group meetings more easily, either because they are 
more sensitive to collective activities or simply because they lack physical collateral and are 
required to engage in collective activities (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; Mayoux, 2001). 
Lending approaches are usually correlated with broader social missions. Village banks and 
solidarity group lenders generally aim to reach poorer households, including women (Cull et al., 
2008). 
Similarly, the provision of nonfinancial services—such as health services, basic literacy training, 
and business training— alongside microfinance, often referred to as ‘microfinance plus’,  might 
also have an impact on gender bias. Those MFIs providing nonfinancial services normally do so 
to service poorer and more marginalized customers (Lensink and Mersland, 2009). It also argued 
that women more readily accept nonfinancial services, while also needing them more 
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; Mayoux, 2001, forthcoming). In conclusion, focus on women 
might be influenced by the MFI’s lending methodology and we expect such a focus to be greater 
in collective methods, which can be summarized in the following hypotheses: 
 
 
H2a. Village banks focus more on women 
H2b. Solidarity groups focus more on women 
H2c. Finance plus activities are associated with a greater focus on women 
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c. Loan Size 
Women are likely to get smaller loans because of either demand issues or supply issues. As far as 
demand is concerned, women are usually engaged in small-scale activities that require less 
capital. It is also argued that they are more risk adverse and therefore less likely to ask for large 
loans that exceed their repayment capacity (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; Phillips and Bhatia-
Panthaki, 2007). As far as supply is concerned, Fletschner (2009) argues that the lack of physical 
collateral may prevent MFIs from providing large loans to women. In conclusion, we expect that 
focus on women is associated with smaller average loans, which can be described by the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3. A smaller average loan is associated with greater focus on women 
 
d. Female Leadership 
Female CEOs may be more concerned with empowerment and social engagement towards 
women. Similarly, female leadership might help identify and address female market issues 
(Cheston, 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2009). In highly patriarchal contexts, female staff and 
female leadership might even be essential to reaching women (Mayoux, forthcoming). Therefore, 
we expect focus on women to be influenced by female leadership, which can be described by the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H4. Having a female CEO is associated with a greater focus on women 
 
e. Legal Status and Regulation 
MFIs come in different legal forms and gender focus might differ with the MFI’s legal status. 
For instance, nonprofit organizations such as NGOs tend to have broader objectives and 
governance forms that make them more likely to reach marginalized customers such as women 
(Mersland, 2009). Regulation is often associated with mission drift, which is usually understood 
as less attention being paid to poor clients and women (Copestake, 2007; Cull et al., 2008). 
Following these arguments, the following hypotheses can be derived: 
 
H5a. A nonprofit status is associated with a greater focus on women 
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H5b. Regulated MFIs are associated with a lesser focus on women 
 
Conscious Gender Bias and Profitability 
What is the impact of focusing on women on MFI performance? This sub-section discusses the 
hypotheses that will be tested with respect to the relation between female focus and profitability. 
We suggest that female focus may have a differential impact on two main aspects of the MFI’s 
overall profitability, repayment and costs. 
 
a. Repayment 
The assertion that women are good credit risks is regularly put forward by microfinance 
advocacy networks and sponsors. As argued before, many studies document that women do 
indeed pay better than men (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; D’Espallier et al., 2009; Gibbons 
and Kasim, 1991; Hossain, 1988; Hulme, 1991; Kevane et Wydick, 2001; Khandker et al. 1995; 
World Bank, 2007). Therefore the impact of focusing on women might positively influence 
repayment, which can be described by the following hypothesis: 
 
H6. A greater focus on women is associated with higher loan repayment rates. 
 
b. Costs 
Microfinance organizations have different options to reduce costs: scales economies through 
extending their client base or increasing the profit margin through serving existing customers 
with larger loans and more services. Cull et al. (2008) find that the second option is the most 
efficient and that transacting small loans significantly increases costs. Since women are likely to 
get smaller loans either because of demand issues (women prefer smaller, less risky loans; the 
scale of women’s activities is usually smaller) or supply issues (women have less collateral at 
their disposal), we expect focus on women to be associated with the larger costs associated with 
smaller loans. Similarly, other gender aspects may induce additional costs associated with female 
focus. For instance, lower literacy levels and lower geographic mobility may induce higher 
transaction costs. In conclusion, we expect a positive relation between female focus and 
operational costs, which can be summarized as follows: 
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H7. A greater focus on women is associated with higher costs related to smaller loans 
 
c. Overall profitability 
Since any profit function includes both income and costs and we expect a differential impact of 
female focus on different aspects of profitability, the relation between focus on women and 
overall profitability is a priori unclear. This hypothesis can be summarized as follows: 
 
H8. A greater focus on women could have a positive or negative effect on overall MFI 
profitability. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Data and Summary Statistics 
Financial and general data for this study were collected from 379 MFIs operating in seventy-
three different countries worldwide. The data have been extracted from rating assessment reports 
gathered by specialized rating agencies supported by the Rating Fund of CGAP 
(www.ratingfund.org). At each rating up till four years of data were obtained and the ratings 
were performed during the period 2001–2008.  
No dataset is perfectly representative of the microfinance field. In particular, our dataset contains 
relatively few of the megasized MFIs and it does not cover the virtually endless number of small 
savings and credit cooperatives. The former are rated by such agencies as Moody’s and Standard 
& Poor’s, while the latter are not rated. 
Different inflation rates in the seventy-three countries make comparisons difficult for all 
monetary variables. We solve this problem by converting the monetary variables into US dollar 
amounts at the going exchange rate. From the purchasing power parity theorem of international 
finance (Solnik and McLeavey, 2004), conversion into US dollars implies that local inflation has 
been adjusted for. 
Table 1 provides a detailed description of the main variables that were used as well as a number 
of summary statistics. The variables are divided into general and financial variables; variables 
11 
 
related to gender and organizational variables, and variables related to MFI methodology. The 
variables related to gender; organization, and methodology are dummies, whereas the general 
and financial variables are continuous variables. For the latter category, variables that are 
naturally skewed have been transformed to their natural logs to avoid any problems related to 
normality assumptions. 
As can be seen from the general and financial variables, the mean natural logarithm of total 
assets is 14.68, which corresponds to total assets of US$ 6,122,000. Similarly, the mean natural 
logarithm of the average loan size is 5.85, which corresponds to an average loan of 712 dollars. 
The mean MFI is fourteen years old, has an ROA of 1 per cent, an ROE of 5 per cent, an OSS of 
1.24, and a FSS of 0.97. The debt rate, calculated as total debt divided by total assets, is 0.48 and 
the expense rate, defined as total operational costs divided by total assets, is 0.19. 
Two variables related to gender are used, namely, conscious gender bias and female CEO. 
Conscious gender bias is defined as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the MFI has a 
conscious gender bias towards women and 0 otherwise. This dummy variable is constructed 
based on information from the rating reports. As can be seen, in 42 per cent of cases MFIs have a 
conscious gender bias towards women. The variable female CEO indicates that in 29 per cent of 
the cases MFIs have a female leader. 
The variables related to organizational structure reveal the following: In 32 per cent of cases, the 
MFI is part of an international network, 27 per cent are regulated by a banking authority, and 38 
per cent of the MFIs are initiated by an international founder. Finally, in 31 per cent of cases, the 
MFI is a bank or some other type of shareholder financial institution. 
Looking at the variables related to methodology, 18 per cent of the MFIs operate as village banks 
and 27 per cent employ mainly a solidarity group lending methodology. 82 per cent of the MFIs 
are not involved in microfinance plus activities and 23 per cent of the MFIs operate in rural 
areas. Finally, in 35 per cent of cases, MFIs offer voluntary savings in addition to loans. 
 
< Insert Table 1 around here > 
 
Estimation Methods 
The first empirical question in this paper relates to characterizing the variables that are 
significantly related to a conscious gender bias towards women. To address this issue we 
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perform a logit analysis where the dependent variable is the dummy for conscious gender bias. In 
line with our hypotheses, we use a wide variety of independent variables related to international 
orientation (international initiator and international network), female leadership (female CEO), 
lending methodology (village banks, solidarity groups, finance plus), legal status (ownership and 
regulatory status), and average loan size while controlling for a number of other effects such as 
size, age, rural, and regional dummies. To check the robustness of the results we also report 
probit estimates for the same regressions. 
The second empirical question relates to analysing how a conscious gender bias affects different 
aspects of profitability. To address this issue we employ a random effects (RE) regression, where 
the dependent variables are profitability measures and the independent variable is conscious 
gender bias together with a variety of controls
5
. In line with our hypotheses, we look at portfolio-
at-risk to measure repayment, average loan size to analyse the size of the loan amounts, and 
profitability in terms of OSS, FSS, ROA, and ROE. We experiment with a wide variety of 
controls that have been suggested in previous performance studies and experiment with time and 
regional dummies. 
We provide two important robustness checks for the RE model in case some of the assumptions 
underlying the RE estimation are violated. First, the RE model assumes that regressors are 
uncorrelated with the unobserved effect µi. If, however, some unobserved variable is omitted 
from the analysis that is correlated with one of the regressors, µi will be correlated with that 
regressor, making the estimates on that parameter biased or inconsistent. Therefore, besides 
looking at the RE model, we also re-estimate some of the equations using the Hausman–Taylor 
approach. This is in essence an instrumental variables approach that fits RE models where some 
of the covariates might be correlated with the unobserved institution-specific effect µi (Hausman 
and Taylor, 1981). 
Second, the variable conscious gender bias is time invariant over the observed sample period. In 
addition, the MFI’s legal status and geographical focus (urban versus rural) and the regional 
dummies are also time-invariant variables. Therefore, we re-estimate some of the regressions 
                                                          
5
 An RE model has a number of important benefits that have made it popular in prior performance studies. First, the 
RE model takes into account all unobserved institution-specific residual variations in MFI performance in the term 
µi, thereby reducing any bias resulting from potential omitted variables (Stock and Watson, 2007). Second, the RE 
model is better suited to tackle the time-invariant nature of some of the covariates than, for instance, the fixed effects 
model that eliminates time-invariant variables by first-differencing (Hartarska, 2005; Lensink and Mersland, 2009; 
Stock and Watson, 2007).    
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using the fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) estimator developed in Plümper and 
Troeger (2007), designed to tackle time-invariant covariates in models that take up unobserved 
institution-specific effects. This estimator employs a three-step estimation approach to produce 
efficient parameter estimates when covariates are time invariant and has been used in the 
microfinance context in a recent paper by Lensink and Mersland (2009). 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Univariate Statistics 
Table 2 univariately presents differences between MFIs with and without conscious gender bias. 
It gives us a first indication whether MFIs with a female focus are substantially different from 
those that have no female focus. Column (3) presents t-stats and significance levels for an 
unpaired mean comparison test that analyses whether the observed differences between the 
groups are statistically significant. Overall, the results indicate significant differences between 
MFIs that have a conscious gender bias and those that do not. 
The first two variables indicate that MFIs with a conscious gender bias are more often part of an 
international network and more frequently initiated by an international founder, the differences 
being highly significant. This is in support of hypotheses 1a and 1b that predict that international 
orientation is associated with greater female focus. The variables village bank, solidarity groups, 
and finance only indicate that MFIs with a conscious gender bias more frequently employ group-
lending methodologies and more often provide finance-plus services. The differences are highly 
significant and in support of hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, which predict that female focus is 
associated with collective methods. 
Similarly, we find that a conscious gender bias is significantly associated with a lower average 
loan size and female CEO, in line with hypotheses 3 and 4, which predict that female focus is 
associated with smaller loans and female leadership. Finally, we find that MFIs with a conscious 
gender bias are less often banks or other types of shareholder financial institutions and are less 
often regulated by banking authorities. This is in support of hypotheses 5a and 5b, which predict 
that a noncommercial legal status is associated with greater female focus. 
14 
 
Regarding the different profitability measures, we see that portfolio-at-risk is significantly lower 
and expense rate significantly higher for MFIs with a conscious gender bias. This finding 
indicates that MFIs that focus more on women get better repayment rates and therefore have a 
lower portfolio-at-risk (hypothesis 6). However, female focus is also associated with more costs 
resulting from the smaller loans (hypothesis 7). The overall profitability measures ROA, ROE, 
FSS, and OSS suggest no significant differences in terms of overall profitability between MFIs 
with conscious gender bias and their counterparts. This suggests that the positive repayment 
effect is offset by higher costs associated with smaller loans, with the net result of similar overall 
profitability measures. 
 
< Insert Table 2 around here > 
 
 What  MFI Characteristics Are Associated with Conscious Gender Bias? 
Table 3 summarizes the results from the logit regression that analyses the main determinants of 
having a conscious gender bias (hypotheses 1–5). The different columns represent different 
controls that were added subsequently. Columns (4)–(6) present the same regressions, but here a 
probit analysis is conducted to assert the robustness of the results. As can be seen, the results 
remain quite robust to the inclusion of additional controls such as MFI size and age in column 
(2), as well as regional dummies in column (3). Similarly, the results usually do not change when 
probit is used instead of logit. 
When going through Table 3, it can be seen that the results are very similar to the univariate 
analysis carried out in Table 2. Having an international network and an international initiator is 
significantly related to a conscious gender bias, in support of hypotheses 1a and 1b. Collective 
methods are also significantly related to a conscious gender bias, as can be seen from the 
variables village banks and solidarity groups, in line with hypotheses 2a and 2b. However, the 
coefficient for finance only is always close to zero and never statistically significant. This 
indicates that, controlling for other factors, providing additional services besides financial ones is 
not significantly related to having a conscious gender bias, such that we find no significant 
evidence of hypothesis 2c. 
Furthermore, a lower average loan size and a female CEO are significantly related to having a 
conscious gender bias, in support of hypotheses 3 and 4. Also, the coefficient for banks and 
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financial institutions indicate that a conscious gender bias is significantly associated with a 
noncommercial legal status, in support of hypothesis 5a.  
 
< Insert Table 3 around here > 
 
How Does Conscious Gender Bias Affect Profitability? 
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results from regressing conscious gender bias as well as a 
number of control variables on overall profitability measures (hypotheses 6–8). Panel A of Table 
4 analyses the impact of conscious gender bias on ROA and OSS. Robustness checks are carried 
out for ROE and FSS as profitability measures. Panel B analyses the impact of conscious gender 
bias on portfolio-at-risk and average loan size. 
The control variables were taken from prior performance studies conducted by Hartarska (2005), 
Mersland and Strøm (2008, 2009), and Lensink and Mersland (2009) and include size, age, 
(natural logarithm of) total costs, debt rate, lending methodology, legal status, geographical 
focus, and regulation. We also experiment with regional and time dummies that are subsequently 
introduced in the regression equation in the different columns. 
As can be seen from panel A in Table 4, a conscious gender bias does not significantly affect 
overall profitability in terms of ROA or OSS—columns (1)–(3) and columns (4)–(6), 
respectively—controlling for other factors. The coefficients for conscious gender bias are never 
statistically significant in any of the regressions. Using ROE and FSS yields similar results and 
the results are also robust to the inclusion of regional and time dummies. This finding confirms 
that female focus does not influence overall profitability measures, in line with the univariate 
analysis. The control variables are usually significant and in line with prior performance-studies. 
Specifically, higher profitability is significantly associated with lower costs, larger MFIs, an 
efficient staff, a lower debt rate, individual-based lending, and providing financial services only. 
Column (1) in panel B of Table 4 shows that a conscious gender bias is negatively related with 
portfolio-at-risk after controlling for other factors. The coefficient is always significant at the 
5 per cent significance level and is robust to the inclusion of regional and time dummies—see 
columns (2) and (3). These findings are in line with the univariate analysis and reflect that MFIs 
with a deliberate female focus have better repayment rates. 
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Columns (4)–(6) investigate the impact of a conscious gender bias on the average loan size. As 
can seen, the coefficient is always negative and highly significant, confirming the finding that a 
conscious gender bias is associated with smaller loans. The coefficient is robust to the inclusion 
of regional or time dummies. The coefficient of ln(costs) is also always significantly negative, 
indicating that more costs are associated with smaller loans. 
Overall, the results confirm hypotheses 6–8 that were drawn with respect to profitability. MFIs 
with a conscious gender bias do get better repayment rates and therefore exhibit lower portfolio-
at-risk. However, they also face higher costs associated with smaller loans. It seems that the 
positive repayment effect associated with women is offset by the higher costs associated with 
smaller loans, leading to similar overall profitability measures. 
 
< Insert Table 4 around here > 
 
 Robustness Checks 
Table 5 re-estimates some of the regressions using the Hausman–Taylor regression approach. As 
argued previously, this approach accounts for the fact that parameter estimates from the RE 
model might be biased because regressors might be correlated with the unobserved institution 
effect. The results are very similar to those returned by the RE estimator.  As can be seen from 
columns (1) and (2), conscious gender bias has a significant impact on OSS and ROA. Columns 
(3) and (4) again indicate a significantly negative impact of gender bias on portfolio-at-risk and 
average loan size. 
 
< Insert Table 5 around here > 
 
Table 6 re-estimates the same regressions using the FEVD estimator. As previously argued, this 
estimator accounts for the fact that many covariates, including conscious gender bias, are time 
invariant. The results are very similar to what was found in previous tables. Again, conscious 
gender bias has a highly negative impact on portfolio-at-risk and average loan size, whereas 
there is no significant impact on overall profitability in terms of ROA or OSS. 
 
< Insert Table 6 around here > 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This study aims to provide empirical evidence of the reasons and effects of having a conscious 
gender bias towards women in microfinance. Specifically, we want to know the main 
characteristics associated with a conscious gender bias and how it affects overall performance. 
Although in the previous literature many studies have documented that many MFIs do indeed 
favor women (Mody, 2000; Yunus, 2002) and that these MFIs usually have better repayment 
records (Kevane and Wydick, 2001; Khandker et al., 1995; among others), no empirical studies 
of which we know have been able to identify in detail the motives and consequences of having a 
conscious gender bias towards women. 
Based on a large global dataset of 379 MFIs active in seventy-three countries worldwide, we find 
that a conscious gender bias is significantly related with international orientation, collective 
methods, female leadership, smaller loans, and a noncommercial legal status. With respect to 
financial performance, we find that a conscious gender bias positively affects repayment, leading 
to lower portfolio-at-risk. However, a conscious gender bias is also associated with higher costs 
resulting from lower average loan sizes. The net result is that MFIs with a conscious gender bias 
have overall profitability measures similar to those of their counterparts in terms of OSS, FSS, 
ROA, and ROE. These findings are confirmed both univariately and multivariately and the 
multivariate analyses are robust to different estimation methods, controls, and the inclusion of 
time and regional dummies. 
These findings bring out a number of implications that might be of interest to academics and 
practitioners in the field. First, our results shed light on the debate on the relation between 
commercialization and poverty reduction. As many authors point out, the commercialization and 
formalization the microfinance market is undergoing could lead to mission drift in the sense that 
MFIs will seek more profitable customers at the expense of the poorest, who are often women 
(Christen, 2001; Copestake, 2007; Cull et al., 2008; Dichter and Harper, 2007). Others argue that 
a win-win situation is possible where financial sustainability is perfectly compatible with a focus 
on the poor. 
Our results indicate that a commercial status is indeed related to a lesser focus on women, which 
could reflect the fact that MFIs are turning towards more profitable customers at the expense of 
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women. In this respect, the results support the fear expressed by many, that the 
commercialization of microfinance could be incompatible with MFIs’ social mission, including a 
gender mission. At the same time, the results also indicate that MFIs that focus on women have, 
despite higher costs, better repayment records and maintain similar profitability measures. This 
evidence indicates that serving women and still obtaining reasonable profitability measures are 
indeed not incompatible. Moreover, it seems that if MFIs that focus on women were better able 
to control costs, the enhanced repayment effect could become an important advantage to enhance 
overall profitability. In this respect our results seem in line with those of Mayoux (2007), who 
argues that the increased commercialization of microfinance is both a threat and an opportunity 
in terms of gender. It is a threat because mission drift could drive MFIs away from women. 
However, commercialization together with recent advances in technology could also lead to 
reduced costs, which could lead to increased access to financial services for women. 
Second, our results indicate that financial performance is a complex issue consisting of different 
aspects that should be evaluated simultaneously. Most of the studies in the literature on gender 
within microfinance have looked at repayment only while ignoring all other aspects of MFI 
profitability. However, a conscious gender bias seems to have a different impact on different 
aspects of profitability, that is, a positive repayment effect but a negative effect on total operating 
expenses. Rather than studying one aspect in isolation, different aspects of profitability should be 
evaluated simultaneously so that we can fully understand the impact of gender on MFI 
performance. 
Our research can be extended in several directions. First, costs have been measured in terms of 
total expenditures as well as the expense rate (total expenditures divided by total assets). 
However, we have not been able to diversify between different sorts of costs. Future research 
could be aimed at analysing how a female focus impacts different aspects of an MFI’s cost 
function. 
Second, in terms of gender, we have focused mainly on a dummy variable that indicates whether 
or not MFIs have a conscious gender bias towards women. Although we believe that rating 
agencies are in a good position to evaluate MFIs’ gender policies, it would be interesting to 
extend this research by considering other gender-related variables. Finally, our findings are based 
upon an aggregate global analysis, which means that the relations identified hold on average or 
across the worldwide sample that was studied. However, as gender relationships and cultural 
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norms can vary considerably across regions, it would be interesting to study the observed 
relations in detail within different regions and cultural settings. 
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Table 1. Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
This table provides a description and a number of summary statistics for the main variables used throughout this study.  
Variables are divided into general and financial variables, variables related to gender, organizational variables, and variables 
regarding the methodology used by the MFI. 
 
Variables  Description    n  Mean St. dev. Min  Max 
 
General and financial variables 
Size   total assets (in $ 1,000)    1,299 6,122 1,420 19 248,000 
lnTA   natural logarithm of total assets   1,299 14.68 1.37 9.86 19.32 
Age   years of experience as an MFI   1,323 14.84 8.49 2 86 
Average loan size  natural logarithm of the average loan size  1,188 5.85 1.20 0 10.11 
ROA   return on assets     1,244 0.01 0.12 -0.99 0.34 
ROE   return on equity    1,153 0.05 0.27 -0.91 0.56 
OSS   operational self-sufficiency   754 1.24 0.57 0.08 3.00 
FSS   financial self-sufficiency   735 0.96 0.37 0.06 3.00 
PaR30   portfolio-at-risk (30 days or more in arrears)  1,196 0.07 0.09 0 0.97 
Debt rate   total debt divided by total assets   1,295 0.48 0.29 0 0.97 
ln(costs)    natural logarithm of total expenses  1,292 12.79 1.36 7.04 17.44 
Expense rate  total expenses divided by total assets  1,299 0.19 0.15 0.002 1 
 
Gender 
Conscious gender bias1 if MFI has conscious gender bias  1,275 0.42 0.49 0 1  
  towards women and 0 otherwise 
 
Female CEO   1 if the MFI has a female CEO and   1,125 0.29 0.45 0 1 
   0 otherwise 
 
Organizational 
International network  1 if the MFI is part of an international  1,316 0.32 0.47 0 1 
   network and 0 otherwise 
 
Regulated    1 if the MFI is regulated by a   1,278 0.27 0.45 0 1 
   banking authority and 0 otherwise 
 
International initiator  1 if the MFI is initiated by a governmental   1,311 0.38 0.49 0 1 
   program and 0 otherwise 
 
Bank and NBFI  1 if the MFI has the legal status of bank or   1,318 0.31 0.46 0 1 
   non-bank financial institution 
 
 
Methodology 
Village Bank  1 if the MFI is a village banker     1,310 0.18 0.38 0 1 
   and 0 otherwise 
 
Solidarity Groups  1 if the MFI operates by solidarity groups   1,305 0.27 0.44 0 1 
   and 0 otherwise 
 
Finance only  1 if the MFI provides financial services only  1,295 0.82 0.38 0 1 
   and 0 otherwise 
 
Rural   1 if the MFI operates only in rural areas   1,116 0.23 0.42 0 1 
   and 0 otherwise 
 
Voluntary savings  1 if the MFI offers voluntary savings  1,310 0.35 0.48 0 1 
   and 0 otherwise 
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Table 2. Differences in Conscious Gender Bias 
 
This tables analyses differences between MFIs with a conscious gender bias (conscious gender bias = 1) and without a conscious 
gender bias (conscious gender bias = 0) for a selection of variables. The third column provides t-stats for an unpaired mean 
comparison test.Here*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
    Conscious gender bias = 1  Conscious gender bias = 0  t-Stat 
 
International network  0.46   0.22    -9.43*** 
International initiator  0.49   0.30    -6.72*** 
Village bank   0.28   0.07    -9.99*** 
Solidarity group   0.33   0.21    -4.81*** 
Finance only   0.76   0.86    4.40*** 
Average loan size 5.32   6.28    14.53*** 
Female CEO   0.36   0.22    -5.12*** 
Bank and NBFI   0.18   0.42    9.36*** 
Regulated   0.19   0.34    6.30*** 
PaR30    0.05   0.07    2.99*** 
Expense rate   0.21   0.17    -4.13*** 
ROA    0.004   0.007    0.47 
ROE    0.04   0.05    0.71 
OSS    1.30   1.20    -2.15** 
FSS    0.98   0.93    -1.74* 
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Table 3. What Characteristics Are Associated with Conscious Gender Bias? 
 
This table analyses which variables influence whether or not MFIs operate under a conscious gender bias towards women. Columns (1)–(3) report results from the logit analyses 
where different controls were subsequently added. Columns (4)–(6) report probit regression results. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Here *,**, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10%-levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable gender bias (yes = 1/no = 0)   Logit      Probit 
      (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Organization  International network 0.96  1.03  1.23  0.58  0.60  0.72 
      (0.175)*** (0.192)*** (0.218)*** (0.104)*** (0.110)*** (0.120)*** 
   Bank regulated  0.12  0.17  0.21  0.07  0.08  0.10 
      (0.246)  (0.250)  (0.260)  (0.140)  (0.142)  (0.149) 
   International initiator 0.61  0.50  0.69  0.34  0.27  0.41 
      (0.188)*** (0.195)** (0.211)*** (0.108)*** (0.111)** (0.122)*** 
   Female CEO  0.94  0.92  0.96  0.54  0.53  0.57 
      (0.193)*** (0.193)*** (0.198)*** (0.112)*** (0.112)*** (0.114)*** 
 
Methodology  Village bank  1.11  1.15  1.14  0.64  0.67  0.66 
      (0.288)*** (0.295)*** (0.311)*** (0.165)*** (0.167)*** (0.175)*** 
   Solidarity groups  0.52  0.49  0.46  0.32  0.30  0.27 
      (0.235)*** (0.235)*** (0.248)** (0.139)*** (0.140)*** (0.146)*** 
   Average loan size  -0.70  -0.74  -0.70  -0.41  -0.43  -0.41 
      (0.109)*** (0.116)*** (0.132)*** (0.062)*** (0.065)*** (0.075)*** 
   Finance only  0.01  -0.08  0.05  0.01  -0.03  0.04 
      (0.223)  (0.224)  (0.233)  (0.131)  (0.131)  (0.135) 
   Rural   0.04  0.02  0.01  0.05  0.05  0.02 
      (0.245)  (0.249)  (0.256)  (0.135)  (0.137)  (0.142) 
 
Legal status  Bank and NBFI  -0.85  -0.95  -0.87  -0.48  -0.53  -0.48 
      (0.238)*** (0.243)*** (0.251)*** (0.136)*** (0.138)*** (0.143)*** 
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Dependent variable gender bias (yes = 1/no = 0)   Logit      Probit 
      (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
 
Controls   lnTA     0.08  0.06    0.04  0.04 
        (0.073)  (0.074)    (0.041)  (0.042) 
   Age     -0.02  -0.03    -0.01  -0.02 
        (0.013)  (0.014)    (0.007)  (0.008)** 
 
 
Region   LA       1.20      0.73 
          (0.351)***     (0.196)*** 
   MENA       1.64      0.99 
          (0.415)***     (0.232)*** 
   S-AFRICA      0.92      0.56 
          (0.426)      (0.236)* 
   ASIA       1.04      0.62 
          (0.518)      (0.291) 
 
Statistics 
N      813  813  808  813  813  808 
Wald χ²      172***  168***  193***  205***  200***  239*** 
Pseudo R²     0.26  0.26  0.28  0.25  0.26  0.28 
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Table 4. How Does Conscious Gender Bias Affect Performance? 
 
This table reports the regression results from regressing conscious gender bias and necessary controls on a number of performance measures such as ROA, OSS (panel A),  
average loan size, and PaR30 (panel B). A random coefficients model is used that allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the performance variables. Robust standard errors are 
provided in parentheses. Here *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A.     ROA      OSS 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Gender bias (yes = 1/no = 0)  -0.01  -0.01  -0.001  0.09  0.10  0.15 
     (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.061)  (0.062)  (0.062) 
 
lnTA     0.09  0.09  0.09  0.33  0.34  0.31 
     (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.043)*** (0.045)*** (0.045)*** 
Age     -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
     (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Rural     -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.19  -0.18  -0.16 
     (0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.071)*** (0.074)** (0.072)*** 
Bank regulated    -0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.02  0.00  -0.02 
     (0.013)*** (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.070)  (0.072)  (0.069) 
Village bank    0.01  0.01  0.01  0.09  -0.14  -0.11 
     (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.086)  (0.091)  (0.088) 
Solidarity group    -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02  -0.05   
     (0.012)** (0.012)*  (0.014)** (0.076)  (0.078)  (0.075) 
Staff efficiency    0.03  0.04  0.03  0.11  0.11  0.10 
     (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.039)*** (0.040)*** (0.039)** 
ln(costs)     -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.30  -0.28  -0.27 
     (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.043)*** (0.045)*** (0.044)*** 
Debt rate    -0.04  -0.06  -0.06  -0.15  -0.19  -0.23 
     (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.085)** (0.088)** (0.087)** 
Voluntary savings (yes=1/no = 0)  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  -0.20  -0.21  -0.20 
     (0.013)*** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.074)*** (0.077)*** (0.075)*** 
 
Regional dummies    excluded  included  included  excluded  included  included 
Time dummies    excluded  excluded  included  excluded  excluded  included 
N     952  945  945  606  606  606 
Wald χ²     198***  219***  280***  101***  108***  145*** 
R² (overall)    0.20  0.23  0.25  0.17  0.18  0.21 
Notes: 
- Using ROE instead of ROA as the dependent variable yields similar results. Using FSS instead of OSS as the dependent variable yields similar results. 
- A robustness check was carried out that uses the subsidy-adjusted AROA and AROE as a dependent variables instead of ROA and ROE. This check yields similar results. 
- Staff efficiency is the natural logarithm of personnel productivity, which is the total number of credit clients divided by the total number of employees.  All other variables are defined as in Table 1. 
- A robustness check was carried out where the percentage of female clients was used instead of the dummy conscious gender bias. This check yields similar results. 
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Panel B.     Par30      Average loan size 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Gender bias (yes = 1/no = 0)  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02  -0.46  -0.39  -0.34 
     (0.009)** (0.009)*  (0.009)** (0.097)*** (0.083)*** (0.079)*** 
 
ln(costs)     0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.10  -0.13  -0.13 
     (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.032)*** (0.032)*** (0.033)*** 
lnTA     -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.53  0.50  0.49 
     (0.006)*  (0.006)*  (0.006)  (0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.036)*** 
Age     0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
     (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Rural     -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  -0.22  0.02  0.096 
     (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.011)*  (0.105)** (0.094)  (0.088) 
Bank regulated    -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  -0.09  -0.03  -0.08 
     (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.096)  (0.087)  (0.311) 
Village bank    -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.47  -0.35  -0.34 
     (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.089)*** (0.083)*** (0.084)*** 
Solidarity group    0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.65  -0.49  -0.51 
     (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.102)** * (0.091)*** (0.094)*** 
Staff efficiency    -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.59  -0.58  0.57 
     (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.037)*** (0.036)*** (0.036)*** 
Debt rate    0.02  0.02  0.02  0.17  0.29  0.28 
     (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.077)** (0.076)*** (0.076)*** 
Voluntary savings (yes=1/no = 0)  0.03  0.03  0.03  -0.14  0.17  0.16 
     (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.095)  (0.091)*  (0.092)* 
 
Regional dummies    excluded  included  included  excluded  included  included 
Time dummies    excluded  excluded  included  excluded  excluded  included 
N     930  925  925  904  896  896 
Wald χ²     88***  106***  114***  976***  1283***  1288*** 
R² (overall)    0.15  0.22  0.23  0.58  0.69  0.69 
Notes: 
- Staff efficiency is the natural logarithm of personnel productivity, which is the total number of credit clients divided by the total number of employees. All other variables are defined as in Table 1. 
- A robustness check was carried out where the percentage of female clients was used instead of the dummy conscious gender bias. This check yields similar results. 
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Table 5. Instrumental Variables 
 
This table reports the regression results from regressing conscious gender bias and necessary controls on performance variables such as ROA, OSS, PaR30, and average loan 
size, as in Table 4. However, this time the parameters are estimated using the Hausman–Taylor IV regression to account for potential ‘endogeneity’ of the variable conscious 
gender bias. 
 
Dependent variable      ROA   OSS   PaR30   Average loan size 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
 
Gender bias (yes = 1/no = 0)   0.01   0.01   -0.12   -0.64 
      (0.067)   (0.231)   (0.052)**  (0.549)*** 
 
ln(costs)      -0.09   -0.29   0.01   -0.06 
      (0.023)***  (0.069)***  (0.012)   (0.066)* 
lnTA      0.08   0.34   -0.01   0.65 
      (0.025)***  (0.052)***  (0.012)   (0.063)*** 
Age      -0.002   -0.02   0.00   -0.01 
      (0.001)   (0.014)   (0.001)   (0.007) 
Rural      -0.04   -0.19   -0.02   0.20 
      (0.018)**  (0.206)   (0.015)   (0.144) 
Bank regulated     0.01   -0.03   -0.04   0.05 
      (0.017)   (0.011)   (0.013)**  (0.133) 
Village bank     -0.02   -0.03   0.03   -0.04 
      (0.025)   (0.375)   (0.023)   (0.207) 
Solidarity group     -0.03   -0.02   0.03   0.00 
      (0.019)*   (0.351)*   (0.013)**  (0.172) 
Staff efficiency     0.01   0.13   -0.01   -0.51 
      (0.019)   (0.203)   (0.012)   (0.064)*** 
Debt rate      -0.08   -0.24   0.06   0.23 
      (0.032)***  (0.112)**  (0.024)**  (0.196)** 
Voluntary savings (yes=1/no = 0)   -0.03   -0.20   0.04   0.06 
      (0.031)   (0.074)*   (0.018)**  (0.126) 
 
Regional dummies     included   included   included   included 
Time dummies     included   included   included   included 
N      945   606   925   896 
Wald χ²      196***   5666***   557***   421*** 
Notes: 
- To obtain robust standard errors and confidence intervals, bootstrap estimation was used. 
- Besides the Hausman–Taylor procedure, we also experimented with the Amemiya–MaCurdy estimator, which places stricter requirements on the instruments. This yields similar results. 
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Table 6. FEVD 
 
This table reports the regression results from regressing conscious gender bias and necessary controls on performance variables such as ROA, OSS, PaR30, and average loan 
size, as in Table 4. However, this time the parameters are estimated using the FEVD estimator developed in Plümper and Troeger (2007) to account for any bias resulting from 
variables that are constant (or rarely varying) over time. 
 
Dependent variable      ROA   OSS   PaR30   Average loan size 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
 
Gender bias (yes = 1/no = 0)   0.01   0.09   -0.03   -0.29 
      (0.031)   (0.031)   (0.005)***  (0.017)*** 
 
ln(costs)      -0.11   -0.37   0.02   -0.04 
      (0.005)***  (0.027)***  (0.004)***  (0.014)*** 
lnTA      0.14   0.48   -0.02   0.65 
      (0.005)***  (0.028)   (0.004)***  (0.013)*** 
Age      0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
      (0.003)   (0.007)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Rural      -0.05   -0.14   -0.03   -0.03 
      (0.006)***  (0.039)***  (0.005)***  (0.021)**** 
Bank regulated     0.00   -0.02   -0.03   -0.12 
      (0.006)   (0.038)   (0.006)***  (0.022)*** 
Village bank     -0.02   -0.01   -0.01   -0.49 
      (0.006)***  (0.188)   (0.023)   (0.021)*** 
Solidarity group     -0.01   0.05   -0.02   -0.23 
      (0.005)***  (0.146)***  (0.006)   (0.021)*** 
Staff efficiency     0.02   0.16   0.00   -0.52 
      (0.004)***  (0.107)***  (0.003)   (0.012)*** 
Debt rate     -0.12   -0.35   0.09   0.16 
      (0.009)***  (0.053)***  (0.008)***  (0.028)*** 
Voluntary savings (yes=1/no = 0)   -0.09   -0.37   0.07   0.23 
      (0.007)***  (0.042)***  (0.006)***  (0.022)*** 
 
Regional dummies     included   included   included   included 
Time dummies     included   included   included   included 
 
N      952   606   930   904 
F-stat      89***   49***   67***   981*** 
Adj. R²      0.63   0.56   0.55   0.96 
RMSE      0.06   0.20   0.01   0.03 
